Missed Gus Dur

GUS DUR is the unfinished text. As a text, Gus Dur never completely understood, be deciphered, excavated, and reconstructed back the meaning.

Al-Imam al-Allama al-Ghazali in “Fayshal al-Tafriqah” and “Qanun al-Ta’wil” mentions that the text has many layers of meaning that are hierarchies. Like layers of onion, when opening the first layer, we’ll find a second layer, third layer, and so on. The deeper we extracted, the more and more rich the meaning of it.

Likewise, when reading Gus Dur, we will find a lot of meaning with various gradations and dimensions. Sometimes the meanings that do not appear alone, but must be sought and found himself.

Gus Dur had died, but the writing and acting is alive and inspire millions of followers, admirers, sympathizers, and his disciples. Gus Dur also reviled, despised, and even misunderstood by those who had been hostile to it. (Gus Dur, by his own admission, has no enemies)

I became acquainted with Gus Dur through his writings when I was at boarding in Lirboyo, Kediri. “God Not Needed to be Defended” is the first book I read.

Honestly, although I have read many times, I do not understand what this means. It remained dark. For the students who are still sitting in the Elementary level, Gus Dur books classified as heavy reading. The language is not so familiar. Moreover, the “white book” was so popular and not widely read by the students. In fact, at that time the students prohibit consume readings other than “yellow book”.

I bought it because interested with the title: “God Not Needed to be Defended”. The title challenging teachings and doctrines that have been taught in a boarding school: the Lord shall be exalted, God must be lifted, and even God must be fought and contested even by the way of warfare: jihad.

Gus Dur in his writings seems flipping everything, undermining the doctrine that has been so well-established and established. Those kinds of conclusions will appear if we only look at and read the title, without understanding the content and meaning (significance level at the next level).

Often people perceive and understand Gus Dur from the “title”: a fragment of statements that are not integrated. In addition replacing the greetings “Assalamualaikum” with “good morning/ afternoon/evening”, Indonesian Muslims has argue by Gus Dur statement “Al-Qur`an is porn scripture”.

Of course, the spontaneity, the statement gets the reactions of some Muslims. Gus Dur was accused of insulting Islam and Muslims, desecrating holy al-Qur`an as Kalamullah (Allah Words). Because of that statement, Rizieq Shihab, leader of the FPI, up to insult Gus Dur “the blind eyes and blind heart” (broadcast on TV live).

Unfortunately, most are not following down first origin of the statement. Although Gus Dur himself had clarified his statement, the media already overdo fry the statement as a public issue. Porn, said Gus Dur, cannot be defined normatively. The porn concept is in our own heads. It could be, said Gus Dur, certain verses in al-Qur`an, such as QS. al-Baqarah: 233, understood as pornographic that nothing goes wrong in our brain.

After Gus Dur, seems we don’t have religious leader who dared to “put the body” and not afraid to go against the flow tendency of people thinking (commonly). Gus Dur has carry the torch of truth in the midst of darkness, without the slightest fear of abused, reviled, hated, despised even by those who love darkness. Perhaps this is touted QS. Yunus: 62, “Inna awliyâ` Allahi la khawfun alayhim yahzanûn wala hum,” (actually trustees [lover] God was never scared and sad)

At the time of fascism-New Order authoritarianism to exert influence and power is so strong, Gus Dur against by creating a force of civil society and democratic turn.

As a Kyai and also as Islamic thinker, Gus Dur did not have to bother looking for the proposition, reason, comparison, or justification of religion, whether “civil society” and “democracy” does not conflict with Islam? Is it necessary to look for its origin in the early generations of Islam during the Prophet era (peace be upon him) forming the Muslim community? Gus Dur also never asks or inquires what kind of creature “civil society” and “democracy” is? He came from where? And, is it both of them there in al-Qur`an, al-Hadith, or sheets of yellow book?

Gus Dur not need postulate because he is a proposition himself. When Gus Dur defended Ahmadiyah, Chinese communities, or even Inul Daratista, Gus Dur said only that their rights are protected by law. Gus Dur not need froth borrow religious pluralism Ibn Arabi or Rumi.

For Gus Dur, the essence and purpose of religion is only one: humanity. Religion is increasing human values. Also raised the dignity of humanity. The consequences, if there is a religious teachings as contradictory or degrading human values, then the religious teachings should be deciphered and reinterpreted and adapted to the purpose, intent, and human needs.

God does not need human and religion is not for God. If God willed, He would create one nation, one religion, one race, one ethnicity, and one country,” [QS. al-Nahl: 93].

In the chaotic situation like this, we certainly could not have wished Gus Dur reborn. Within a certain time every community there is a “Prophet” himself. Perhaps, at this time, our nation is experiencing a fathrah time—a situation where people lose grip, role models, guidance, and exemplary leader. Wallâhu a’lam bi al-shawâb.

Is Neglect of Rohingya Asylum Seekers Pushing Them to Join ISIS?

WITH the help of Acehnese fishermen, about 1,000 Rohingya asylum seekers arrived on the beaches of North Aceh in April 2015. Indonesia agreed to provide temporary shelter but stressed that the Rohingya would need to be resettled within a year. Last year, I travelled to Aceh to conduct a short research project examining the needs of the Rohingya in these shelters, particularly the needs of women. A fundamental problem with the management of asylum seekers and displaced people is the uniform approach taken – too often governments fail to account for the different needs of male, female and child asylum seekers.

Only later did I find out that the Rohingya weren’t just in Aceh. They could be found in almost all of Indonesia’s immigration detention centres, from Jakarta to East Nusa Tenggara. In Makassar, for example, there were about 400. They had arrived on nearby islands in 2011 and were being kept in a number of safe houses in the city. Only one or two arrived alone, most were families.

Even though Indonesia has not ratified the UN Refugee Convention and is therefore, in theory, not obliged to provide protection for asylum seekers, geographic realities mean that, like it or not, the problem is not going to go away. Conflict in the Middle East and Asia and the ongoing desirability of Australia as a destination country will ensure this is the case.

Rohingya asylum seekers face multiple and severe violations of their rights. The most basic violation is that they are denied citizenship status. Despite living in Rakhine (formerly Arakan) state for centuries, the Myanmar government does not recognise them as citizens, and they have no civil or political rights.

The Rohingya are generally considered to be Bengali Muslims who began settling in the area now known as Rakhine state before British rule. For the Rohingya, Myanmar is their home – their ancestors have lived there for generations. It is true that some Rohingya arrived in the mid-twentieth century, and continue to have familial ties with people in Bangladesh. But that is no reason to erase them from Myanmar.

Organisations like Human Rights Watch have found clear evidence of ethnic cleansing conducted by Myanmar authorities and local ethnic groups (link is external). The Rohingya have been forced to flee their homes, losing their sense of safety and security, their connections to friends and families, and sources of income. In all conflicts, men are considered the primary actors but Rohingya women bear even greater costs. They are second-class citizens in their own groups and often face gender-based violence. They are victims of discrimination because of both their ethnicity and gender.

But the most egregious crime against the Rohingya is the collective indifference of the global community to their plight. It’s true that international institutions dealing with asylum seekers and refugees are stretched thin. But I got the impression the Rohingya barely registered on their radars.

There are a number of reasons that the Rohingya asylum seekers are not considered a priority by the international community. They are poor, many are illiterate, and there are no more than a few hundred thousand. Their numbers are dwarfed by the millions of refugees fleeing conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Refugee politics is like politics anywhere else. As long as the Rohingya have a limited capacity to advocate for their cause, they won’t get as much attention as asylum seekers with more powerful voices.

More than a year after the Rohingya landed in Aceh, few remain. The New York Times recently reported (link is external) that only 46 refugees were accepted in the United States and Canada after the 2015 refugee crisis. With hopes of resettlement so slim, many have been driven back into the arms of people smugglers. According to the International Organisation for Migration, 723 of the 999 Rohingya who landed in Aceh last year have made it to Malaysia, where many Rohingya asylum seekers have found work.

The Rohingya don’t have ambitious dreams. They simply want to live a calm life, send their children to school and find a source of income. “If our homes were safe, why would we risk our children’s lives at sea?” said Muhammad Alam, one of the Rohingya asylum seekers I spoke to in Makassar. They are sick of being victims of conflict and living without certainty in a country that rejects their existence.

This makes it all the more surprising that a number of them have revised their dreams about their destination country. Most of the Rohingya refugees I spoke to in Makassar still hoped to be accepted in Australia, Europe or Canada. But when I asked the same question to Rohingya in Aceh, the result was quite different. More than a few of them – even women – expressed a desire to travel to Syria. Their logic was simple but understandable. They are risking their lives for the hope of one day being accepted in a western country that might be able to offer them the better life they seek. With this seemingly out of reach, why not risk their lives to establish a country that could one day fulfil their needs – a promised land, created to uphold the law of God. This is what the see Islamic State as offering. They have already tried to fight for their lives with civilised means, but the neglect of the global community now seems to have driven them to take a more barbaric route.[]

_____________________________
Lies Marcoes Natsir has recently released a book on her research in Aceh, Berlayar Tanpa Berlabuh: Perempuan Pengungsi Rohingya di Aceh dan Makassar [Sailing Without Docking: Female Rohingya Asylum Seekers in Aceh and Makassar], published by Rumah KitaB.

Child Marriage Thrives in Urban Areas Too

BETWEEN 2014 and 2016, Rumah Kita Bersama (Rumah KitaB) conducted research on child marriage in Banten, West Java (Cirebon, Cisarua/Bogor, Sukabumi), East Java (Lamongan, Madura), West Nusa Tenggara and South Sulawesi.

This study noted the impact of socio-ecological changes in the change of gender relations in families, which has contributed to the practice of child marriage.

It also examined the influence of formal and informal institutions, as well as religious views perpetuated through cultural beliefs and practices, all of which have an impact on the practice of child marriage.

Migration, as a consequence of the changes in socio-ecological space, leaves many girls as the substitute for their parents at home.

At the same time, female sexuality is considered alarming; therefore, it should be expressed only within the institution of marriage.

Meanwhile, those who join the exodus from the countryside to other areas, especially to urban areas and bring along the entire family, threaten the continuity of their children’s education. Such moves can lead to a loss of access to education, for both boys and girls.

As new arrivals with no fixed abode, they bring along their family members to contribute unpaid labor, just so that the family can survive. They live in the outskirts of the cities, in no man’s lands and do various odd jobs in the informal sector.

This interrupted access to education has different impacts on boys and on girls. Boys will become underage workers. While girls also experience this, they are more often encouraged to get married as early as possible. This is not only to reduce the family’s economic burden; many parents feel they can no longer control their daughters’ social relations.

In Asia, Indonesia receives attention as one of the major contributors to this negative practice. In the SDG targets, Indonesia has committed to eliminate all harmful practices, including child marriage.

Yet according to the Central Statistical Agency (BPS), 25 percent of ever-married women aged 20 to 24 were married before the age of 18.

And because of its large population, Indonesia is among the top 10 countries in the world in absolute terms in the number of child brides.

In early August 2016, BPS, supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), launched a report on “Analysis of Data on Child Marriage in Indonesia” based on data from the National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas)and the 2010 Population Census (SP 2010).

The report stated that the prevalence of child marriage in Indonesia has declined more than twofold over the past three decades, but is still among the highest in the East Asia and Pacific region.

Meanwhile, the result of the Susenas conducted by BPS in 2012 showed that more than one sixth of girls in Indonesia marry before they reach adulthood.

The report concluded that the prevalence of child marriage in Indonesia is not merely remaining high but actually rising again.

To date, most studies on child marriage have focused on rural areas. This is understandable, as the occurrence and support factors such as poverty, limited access to schooling, and strong traditional values, as well as changes in access to economic resources, especially land, can be identified as factors promoting the practice of child marriage in rural areas.

Yet statistically, there is also a significant level of child marriage in urban areas such as Jakarta, Surabaya and Makassar (BPS, 2013). This generally happens among the urban poor and migrants to the cities.

As new arrivals living in isolated environments such as illegal slums, they are hidden from the affluence of the cities. They rarely have any contact with formal institutions or interact with the moderate religious activities conducted by moderate Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.

Instead, they fall prey for fundamentalist groups, which are more active in going into localities considered socially vulnerable (Testimony of the Faithful Servants, 2013). The conservative views that these groups bring in pose a great risk to the safety of girls, such as the appeal to marry off girls in monogamous or even polygamous unions, to give the parents a sense of security from sinful acts.

Apart from parents, an even greater influence on the practice of child marriage comes from informal institutions such as relatives, neighbors, and “institutions” that are not obvious but persist in the minds of the community or
certain groups: for example, fear of embarrassment from being ridiculed by neighbors, fear of sin, the obligation for girls to relieve the burden on their parents, fear of becoming an “old maid”, and so on.

In this perspective, formal and non-formal institutions are important elements that also condition or at least condone the occurrence of child marriage through these unseen pressures.

Rumah KitaB’s study also mapped various ways that are used by formal institutions in perpetuating child marriage, such as the mechanism of granting dispensations and isbat nikah (retroactive confirmation) for underage marriages that have occurred and require legality from the state, and the use of the “N5” form — a statement letter from the parents granting permission for the Religious Affairs Office (KUA) to conduct a marriage for their child.

Village religious figures also play a role in accommodating illegal marriages, and village officials falsify girls’ ages on official records under pressure from parents and the community, all leading to practices of low-level corruption to earn a bit of extra money. The picture above shows that child marriage occurs not just in rural areas but also in the cities.

More than that, it also indicates that the strategies to address child marriage need to look at the very different conditions between the rural and urban contexts.

The need for contraception services, information for adolescents on their bodies and sexuality, and changes in the content and methods of religious outreach, are all agendas that require attention.

At the same time, the effort to eliminate the corrupt practices in formal and non-formal institutions that support the practice of child marriage is a more complex aspect that also needs to be in the agenda of advocacy to combat the practice of child marriage in urban areas.

_______________________________

Lies Marcoes, The writer is executive director of Rumah Kita Bersama Foundation, an Islamic learning organization.

8 Digital Life Skills All Children Need – and a Plan for Teaching Them

By: Yuhyun Park, Chair, infollutionZERO Foundation

A generation ago, IT and digital media were niche skills. Today, they are a core competency necessary to succeed in most careers.

That’s why digital skills are an essential part of a comprehensive education framework. Without a national digital education programme, command of and access to technology will be distributed unevenly, exacerbating inequality and hindering socio-economic mobility.

What’s your DQ?

The challenge for educators is to move beyond thinking of IT as a tool, or “IT-enabled education platforms”. Instead, they need to think about how to nurture students’ ability and confidence to excel both online and offline in a world where digital media is ubiquitous.

Like IQ or EQ – which we use to measure someone’s general and emotional intelligence – an individual’s facility and command of digital media is a competence that can be measured. We call it DQ: digital intelligence. And the good news is that DQ is an intelligence that is highly adaptive.

DQ can broadly be broken down into three levels:

Level 1: Digital citizenship

The ability to use digital technology and media in safe, responsible and effective ways

Level 2: Digital creativity

The ability to become a part of the digital ecosystem by co-creating new content and turning ideas into reality by using digital tools

Level 3: Digital entrepreneurship

The ability to use digital media and technologies to solve global challenges or to create new opportunities

Why are we neglecting digital citizenship?

Of the three, digital creativity is the least neglected, as more and more schools attempt to provide children with some exposure to media literacy, coding and even robotics, all of which are seen as directly related to future employability and job creation. Likewise, there are major education initiatives – from America’s code.org to Africa’s IamTheCode.org – that promote access to coding education.

Digital entrepreneurship has also been actively encouraged, particularly in tertiary education. Many top universities have adopted and developed new courses or initiatives such as technopreneurship and entrepreneurship hackathons to encourage a culture of innovation. We’re even starting to see global movements that nurture social entrepreneurship among children through mentoring programmes – such as the Mara Foundation – and school programmes, like with the Ashoka Changemaker School.

But digital citizenship has often been overlooked by educators and leaders. This is in spite of the fact it is fundamental to a person’s ability to use technology and live in the digital world, a need which arises from a very young age. A child should start learning digital citizenship as early as possible, ideally when one starts actively using games, social media or any digital device.

The digital skills our children should learn

Educators tend to think children will pick up these skills by themselves or that these skills should be nurtured at home. However, due to the digital generation gap, with generation Z being the first to truly grow up in the era of smartphones and social media, neither parents nor teachers know how to adequately equip children with these skills.

Young children are all too often exposed to cyber risks such as technology addiction, cyberbullying and grooming. They can also absorb toxic behavioural norms that affect their ability to interact with others. And while most children encounter such challenges, the problematic exposure is amplified for vulnerable children, including those with special needs, minorities and the economically disadvantaged. They tend to not only be more frequently exposed to risk, but also face more severe outcomes.

So what skills should we be teaching our children as part of their digital citizenship? In the research we’ve done on this matter, we’ve identified eight in particular.

gambar-1

Digital citizen identity: the ability to build and manage a healthy identity online and offline with integrity

Screen time management: the ability to manage one’s screen time, multitasking, and one’s engagement in online games and social media with self-control

Cyberbullying management: the ability to detect situations of cyberbullying and handle them wisely

Cybersecurity management: the ability to protect one’s data by creating strong passwords and to manage various cyberattacks

Privacy management: the ability to handle with discretion all personal information shared online to protect one’s and others’ privacy

Critical thinking: the ability to distinguish between true and false information, good and harmful content, and trustworthy and questionable contacts online

Digital footprints: The ability to understand the nature of digital footprints and their real-life consequences and to manage them responsibly

Digital empathy: the ability to show empathy towards one’s own and others’ needs and feelings online

What a quality digital education looks like

A quality digital citizenship education must include opportunities for assessment and feedback. The assessment tools should be comprehensive as well as adaptive in order to evaluate not only hard but also soft DQ skills. Ultimately, such assessments should serve as a means of providing feedback that gives children a better understanding of their own strengths and weaknesses, so that they may find their own paths to success.

Ultimately, national leaders need to understand the importance of digital citizenship as the foundation of digital intelligence. National education leaders should make it a priority to implement digital citizenship programmes as part of an overall DQ education framework.

Most importantly, individuals should initiate digital citizenship education in their own sphere of influence: parents in their homes, teachers in their classes, and leaders in their communities.

There is no need to wait. In fact, there is no time to wait. Children are already immersed in the digital world and are influencing what that world will look like tomorrow. It is up to us to ensure that they are equipped with the skills and support to make it a place where they can thrive.

Reference: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/09/8-digital-life-skills-all-children-need-and-a-plan-for-teaching-them?utm_content=buffer4422b&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Why Indonesia, the World’s Biggest Muslim Democracy, Should Accept Its LGBT Citizens

By: Yenni Kwok

An alarming rise of anti-LGBT sentiment in Indonesia belies the ideal image of the world’s biggest Muslim democracy

In his overseas trips, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has one favorite topic to discuss with his fellow leaders: Islam and democracy in his country. Indonesia “is a country where Islam and democracy can go hand in hand,” he said during a speech at the U.K. Parliament in April. In his visit at the White House last October, he told President Obama that Islam in Indonesia is “moderate,” “modern” and “tolerant.”

Indonesia prides itself not only for being a country with the world’s biggest Muslim population, but also for its tolerant brand of Islam. Its two largest Muslim organizations, the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist Muhammadiyah, which have a combined membership of some 80 million, are touted as examples of moderate Islam.

But recent events belie the ideal image of the world’s biggest Muslim democracy. In recent months, Indonesia has seen an alarming rise of anti-LGBT sentiment, which Human Rights Watch, in its August report, calls “an unprecedented attack” on the rights of sexual minorities that was stoked by the government. Since January, people from across all sections of Indonesia life, from government officials, politicians, local media, Muslim leaders to even psychiatrists, have joined the chorus of homophobic condemnation, including calls to criminalize and “cure” LGBT people from mental illness.

Vice President Jusuf Kalla told the U.N. Development Program not to carry out LGBT community programs in the country. Defend the Nation, a paramilitary training program that claims some 1.8 million participants, declared homosexuality as one of the nation’s enemies, along with communism and illegal drugs. There were controversies over gay emojis. A transgender Islamic boarding school in the city of Yogyakarta was forced to close down in February after years of existence, following intimidation from hard-line Muslims. And the mainstream Muslim organizations (the NU and Muhammadiyah) issued statements saying that LGBT “lifestyle” is “incompatible with human nature.”

The parliament and the Constitutional Court are the latest battlegrounds with attempts to legally persecute sexual minorities. Indonesian lawmakers are pushing for an anti-LGBT bill, saying it is necessary to protect society from what they term “the LGBT propaganda.” An Islamic pro-family group called the Family Love Alliance has submitted a judicial review to the Constitutional Court, asking the justices to revise the penal code and criminalize gay sex (as well as consensual heterosexual acts outside of marriage). During the latest hearing on Tuesday, Justice Patrialis Akbar signaled his agreement with the expert witnesses who argued the ban would be in line with moral and religious values, saying: “We are not a secular country.”

Founding father Sukarno, however, envisioned Indonesia as a secular, not Islamic state. There are no laws that penalize homosexual acts — except in Aceh province, which implements Shari‘a — but nor are there laws that prohibit discrimination against sexual minorities. This means the LGBT community faces an uneasy balance between disgruntled tolerance and daily prejudice. Anthropologist and Muslim feminist Lies Marcoes says that sexual minorities have long existed throughout the archipelago. “The problem, I believe, is not cultural, but how LGBT has become a political commodity to discriminate,” Lies tells TIME, adding that “since the reform [era], the public space has become more conservative.”

The fall of President Suharto in 1998 ushered in democracy and reform in Indonesia, yet women and religious minorities have become vulnerable to administrative and mob attacks. Hundreds of regional policies have been enacted in the years since that discriminate against minority groups. These include regulations on building houses of worship, night curfews on women and imposing Islamic dress codes. If there’s a lesson to be learned: discriminatory policies have emboldened hard-liners. Religious minorities, such as Christians, Ahmadi and Shi‘ite Muslims, have been driven away from their homes and houses of worship.

There were high hopes when Jokowi, as the current President is widely known, won the election in 2014. A humble, moderate Muslim politician who has a record of working with members of other faiths, he was seen as a figure who would defend pluralism and tolerance in this diverse nation. Two years on, however, human-rights issues have been put on the back burner. When his government revoked thousands of “problematic” regional bylaws in June, they were all regulations that affected businesses — there were none that discriminated against women and religious minorities.

On Aug. 11, on the day HRW released its scathing report, Jokowi’s spokesperson, Johan Budi, said that although the rights of LGBT citizens are protected, “there is no room in Indonesia for the proliferation of the LGBT movement.” His comments were alarming. First, freedom of assembly is a constitutional right. Second, while other democratic countries are advancing LGBT rights, Indonesia seems to be moving in the other direction.

Budi’s comments prompted a response from the Obama Administration. “We encourage Indonesia, which rightly prides itself on diversity and tolerance, to respect and uphold international rights and standards by ensuring equal rights and protections for all of its citizens,” said U.S. State Department spokeswoman Elizabeth Trudeau.

With democracy besieged in much of Asia and the Muslim world, Indonesia seems like a rare beacon. When it comes to the treatment of its LGBT community, however, the country faces two options: uphold its democratic credentials or pander to the intolerant voices. The biggest Southeast Asian country — with its national motto of Unity in Diversity — can be a true pioneering model of democracy if it embraces and is inclusive to its minority groups, including sexual minorities. Otherwise, Indonesia’s — and Jokowi’s — impressive claims simply ring hollow.

Sumber: http://time.com/4458727/indonesia-democracy-lgbt-discrimination/?xid=fbshare

The Irrationality of Religion

Again, acts of terrorism have occurred in Indonesia – the first time this has happened in Indonesia during the month of Ramadhan. It seems that the one who carried out this attack believed he would receive grace from his God. Ramadhan, according to the Al-Quran and hadith in many classical texts, was basically provided specifically as a medium of spiritual training and character building which Muslims can use to become a better person, with humanity and high morals. This is why in the month of Ramadhan, various kinds of rewards (pahala) are provided to those who perform the fast sincerely. But apparently, these criminal acts were intended for the purpose of worship, which is completely contradictory to the actual intent and purpose of Ramadan in Islamic shariah.

Explosions were heard at the Solo City Police Headquarters (Mapolresta), just twelve and a half hours after the Minister of Religious Affairs, H. Drs. Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, announced that 1 Shawwal 1437 H would fall on Wednesday, July 6, 2016. The next day, July 5, 2016, at 7:15 am local time, one day before Eid, an unsuspicious, skinny bearded man, 31 years old, head of RT 001 RW 012,[1] Sangkrah Village, Pasar Kliwon, Surakarta, [2] blew himself up in the Mapolresta Solo Police. One person was killed: the perpetrator himself. Meanwhile, an innocent person was slightly injured, a member of the Mapolresta Solo Provost. Who was this perpetrator? The National Police Chief, General Badroddin Haiti, offered a tentative conclusion that the people responsible were the ISIS network within Indonesia.

The orders used to always be delivered by Bahrun Naim. But now there are new orders from an ISIS spokesman who says that throughout Ramadan it is advisable to commit acts of terror,” reported the National Police Chief, General Badrodin Haiti, at Mapolresta Solo, Jalan Adi Sucipto, on Tuesday July 5, 2016.[3]

Personally, Nur Rahman had a good relationship with his neighbors, since he often helped those within his community. But ever since August 2015, these actions were never seen again.[4]

Two days before that , on 4 July 2016, Saudi Arabia was shaken by three nearly simultaneous terror attacks in three different cities: Jeddah, Madinah and Qatif. In Jeddah, an explosion occurred near the office of the United States Consulate.[5] The one responsible was identified as Abdullah Qaizar Khan, who was working as a private driver. Qaizar Khan, aged 35 years, had lived in Jeddah with his wife and hisas parents for 12 years.[6] One person was killed, the attacker himself, and two local security personnel were injured. The attack in Jeddah was confirmed by a spokesman of the Saudi Ministry of Home Affairs, General Mansour al-Turki, who said that the explosion was nearer to a masjid than it was to the U.S. Consulate.[7]

Following that attack, on the same day, another suicide bombing occured at the parking area of Masjid Nabawi, Medinah, a mere 300 meters from the grave of the Prophet Muhammad. This shocked thousands of Muslims who were praying at Nabawi Mosque during the last 10 days of Ramadan. This attack instantly killed four security personnel and injured several others. Another suicide bombing also occured at a mosque in Qatif; it is suspected that more than one person carried out this attack.

Previously, a terror attack had occurred at the Istanbul airport on 28 June 2016, the 23rd day of Ramadan 1437H. This attack killed 41 people and injured 239. Of the 41 who were killed, 13 were foreign citizens: five Saudi Arabians, two Iraqi, one Chinese, ne Iranian, one Ukrainian, one Tunisian, one Jordanian, and one Uzbek. Turkish citizens were the majority of the victims killed in this attack, with a death toll of 23.[8] The attackers were made up of three men dressed in black, armed with guns and bombs for suicide bombings. A Kurdish militant group claimed to be behind this bloody tragedy.

In Bangladesh, a group of ISIS militants armed with swords and hand grenades attacked a police checkpoint while many citizens were conducting their Eid prayers in Kishoreganj, around 140 kilometers from the capital city of Dhaka, Bangladesh, Thursday, 7 July 2016, the second day of Eid.

Two policemen and a female citizen were killed in the attack. One of the culprits was shot dead, and four other suspects were held after a hand grenade was thrown at the police post right outside of the praying area. Since the beginning of the 19th century, hundreds of thousands of people have used the field of Sholakia Eidgah to conduct their Eid prayers. Islam is the majority religion in Bangladesh, a country with 160 million citizens. This attack occured less than a week after the massacre of hostages at a cafe in Dhaka, in which 20 hostages and two policemen were killed. Most of the victims were stabbed with swords. [9] The total death toll during the hostage incident was 28 people, 6 of whom were the perpetrators, two policemen, while the rest were the hostages, who were mostly foreign nationals.[10]

In Thailand, a number of terror acts also occurred. Four bomb blasts occurred during Ramadhan. On July 5, 2016, an explosion occurred in Pattani, a Muslim-majority province in southern Thailand. The blast killed one policeman and wounded three others. The explosive was hidden in a pickup truck loaded with gasoline. The blast also spread to a nearby police station located at the Ko Mo Kaeng train station, in the town of Nong Chick, on Tuesday morning. Two other explosions occurred at different times in Monday, July 4, 2016. These explosions came from two M79 grenades which exploded at different times. The first blast occurred in front of the mosque in the center of Moo 2 village, Bannang Sata. Four residents were injured and one person died on arrival at Yala Hospital. A short time later, a second grenade exploded on the roof of a house not far from the mosque. The house, owned by a 60 year old man named Mayaki Benmuslim, was also damaged. However, there were no deaths or injuries. The day before, Sunday, July 3, 2016, a bomb attack near Pattani central mosque killed a policeman and three residents were injured. [11]

Exactly one day before Eid, on 5 of July 2016 , a few hours after the Mapolresta suicide bombing in Solo , ISIS uploaded a video containing a declaration of war addressed to the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia. The video contained these statements:

” We declare that we are no longer citizens of your country (Malaysia and Indonesia) , and we have been freed , ” the man said while showing a bearded man holding a Malaysian passport . “With His permission of His presence, we will come to you with a military force that cannot be overcome. This is God’s promise to us. .” [12]

A number of bomb blasts also occurred in Iraq and Syria, where the American/ Russian coalition is battering ISIS. A total of 800 deaths were caused by ISIS attacks around the world during Ramadhan, including the 49 killed in a the attack on gay night club in Florida.[13]

It is such a contradiction: Ramadan, Islam, Allahhu Akbar, God’s Promise, is all religious terminology which they have twisted and used as a reason to kill. They seem to think that in Ramadan all actions are considered as worship, even killing. Yet this is completely contradictory to their true meaning, and it also violates the most fundamental religious teachings. Anger, hatred, jealousy, envy, even merely bad intentions are forbidden during fasting month of Ramadan – let alone killing. One must take a deep breath before reading another article covering the actions of ISIS. The religious terminology that they understand is not only contradictory to the context of Islamic teachings, but also completely irrational. And this irrationality of religion arises from the irrational teachings of radicalism.

One of the main causes of radicalism is rooted from a mistaken understanding of a hadith of the Prophet in the book Arba’in Nawawi, also contained in the book al-Saheeh Bukhari number 25 and in book Saheeh Muslim number 22, narrated by Ibn Umar, Abu Hurayrah, Anas ibn Malik, Ibn Mas’ud, Abdullah ibn Umar ibn ‘Ash, which reads:
> ”Umirtu an uqâtila an-nâsa hatta yasyhadu an Lâ ilâha illallah wa anna muhammada al-rasûlullah, wa yuqîmu al-shalâta wa yu’tu al-zakâta”, which means “I was ordered to kill people until they testify that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah , until they establish regular prayers and practice regular charity .”

They take this to mean the unbelievers non-Muslims) shall be fought until they convert to Islam and live by its beliefs and practices. They believe that infidels should be forced to convert to Islam, or if not then they should be fought and killed. This completely mistaken understanding of this hadith has caused extraordinarily cruel murders as practiced by ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and in various locations around the world. We recall the murder of 20 hostages in Bangladesh because ISIS separatists believed that they could not read the Qur’an,[14] as well as the thousands of victims of the Yazidi sect who are being used as sex slaves, on the grounds that this is permitted as they are non-believers.

In its actual context, this hadith of the Prophet was addressed to the time when the non-Muslim Quraish tribe of Mecca were threatening the security of the Muslim minority in the peninsula. The word “umirtu” was used. This shows clearly the form of the verb fi’il madhi, a verb in the past tense mabni majhul. In Matan Alfiyah of Ibnu Malik, verse 242, it is explained that Maf’ul bih replaces Fa’il in all its consequences. As an example: “Nîla khairu Nâ-ili; the best gift has been obtained.” [15]

The verb form “umirtu” comes from mabni maf’ul with dhamir: “انا “, ana, or I, comes from the verb form “Amarani” meaning “has commanded me”, becomes, “Umirtu”, I was told, what was initially an active verb is turned into a passive verb. The word ‘I’ or I, or in this case the dhamir “انا” implied in the verb that indicates the first person, in this case, the Prophet Muhammad himself said it, referring to himself. By law, the order fell specifically on the Prophet Muhammad himself, and if is made specific to the time of the incident, the word “umirtu” legally fell only to the Prophet, and only in the time of the Prophet. The one who gave the order is Allah. Thus, the order was not addressed to the people of the Prophet Muhammad, either directly or indirectly. However, bizarrely, most hardliners interpret the word “umirtu” as “we were told.” This is a huge mistake, and violates the rules of Arabic literature.

The word “uqâtil” means, I killed. The verb form using the form fâ’ala – yufâ’ilu – Mufâ’alatan, according to the book Alfiyah Ibn ‘Aqil, one of the most respected classical texts in the schools of Arabic literature, a verb with this form means “mutual conduct,” meaning there are two parties doing the same thing. The word “uqâtilu” here means I killed in the field of battle. This means there are special situations and special areas, in situations of war when people are trying to defeat each other and kill each other to achieve a victory that guarantees the safety of themselves and their members. This is not a one-sided situation, in which one side is passive. So the word “uqâtil” is used in a combat situation, where there are two sides attempting to kill each other. In contrast, the word “aqtul” means “I killed”; it is used in times of peace, in which the victim acts passively. So because it uses a “mufâ’alah” form, the meaning of “uqâtil” is used in context of the war that occurred in the time of Prophet Muhammad. It cannot be dragged into another meaning that is not in line with the norms of Arabic literature. Hardliners interpret the word “aqtul” to mean “I will kill; I will continue to kill long as the infidels have not converted to Islam”, because the meaning they use uses fi’il mudhari which is muta’addi, which means “hal” (Current) “Mustaqbal” (will) and aims dawâmah (constantly), which has a subject and object, or a substitute for the subject (passive form). This is a fatal error in the use of Arabic grammar.

Therefore, it is completely inappropriate to use this hadith to legalize murder and terrorist perpetrated against innocent people acts in an entirely peaceful situation, especially since the hadith certainly does not contain a legal message addressed to the community. This hadith is a sentence that told the people the news in those days, in the days of the Prophet, that the Prophet was given the command by Allah to fight against the Quraish infidels of Mecca, because at that time the lives of the Muslims were in danger. Obviously, advocacy was not an option for Prophet Muhammad at the time. Keep in mind here that the Prophet Muhammad never started the war in the first place. All the wars of the Prophet Muhammad were always defensive; the defense of human existence from external threats, not to pose a threat and create destabilization, let alone to perform conquest for the purpose of disseminating the message of Islam, as is understood by those who worship the caliphate.

This hadith it is very popular among Muslims worldwide. If teachers misinterpret its meaning, this is clearly very dangerous: there would be severe consequences, destabilization of security, and acts of terror against humanity, although Islam actually exists to ensure the universal values ​​of humanity. They are changing the very rational face of the religion into something very irrational. Allah SWT has said,
“Do not the Believers know that, had Allah (so) willed, He could have guided all mankind (to the right)?” (Q.S. Al-Ra’d, verse 31).

Women in Religious Court

Women’s access to justice requires a broad horizon of knowledge which understands the reasons why women sue for divorce. Many people have asked, including the Minister of Religious Affairs, Lukman Syaifuddin, when we went to report the results of research by Rumah KitaB on child marriage last April: Why is the number of women who file for divorce so high?

This is the story of Nurani (not her real name). We met her by chance in the hearing room of the Religious Court (Mahkmah Syariyah) in Lhoksukun, North Aceh, in April 2014. It was 10 in the morning, and the waiting room at the Lhoksukun Religious Court was already packed. Four long rows with five seats each were already filled. Extra seats had been provided, but they were all filled as well.

Most of those waiting were women, nearly all of whom were still young. There were only three men: two were there for an inheritance case, and the other was an elderly man who was being sued for divorce by his wife, also quite elderly. The rest were women who were suing for divorce.

In fact, nearly all the people sitting in the waiting room were women in pursuit of a divorce. One woman, escorted by her daughter who was also an adult, was there for a divorce hearing. According to the daughter, her mother could no longer bear to face her father, who had severe anger issues and often physically beat her mother.

Squeezed in among the many people waiting for their hearings was Nurani. She is from the Mantang Baru village in Lapang Lhokseumawe district. Nurani had just turned 17 years old. She was eight months pregnant at the time.

Nurani was suing her husband for divorce because he did not fulfill his responsibilities. She is the first daughter, the second of three siblings. Her parents are farmers and fishers. She had come to court with her mother. Though he was not at sea at the time, Nur’s father did not accompany his daughter since he felt socially awkward. Nur’s older brother is married and lives with his wife in another town, while her sister Nurlela, 13 years old, had only graduated from elementary school and was working as a nanny in Malaysia.

Nurani had completed her education up until the second year of junior high school, but as she went into her third year, she fell seriously ill. Every night she threw a tantrum and ran a fever. Many believed she was sick due to a curse. Nurani is quite beautiful; many were attracted to her, and she told us she had had to refuse men who wanted to go out with her more than a few times.

Eventually she was cured by a local shaman. This shaman forced Nurani into marrying him. He claimed that if she did not, she would stay ill due to her curse. Not long after her treatment process, they were married with the promise that he would pay jeulame for their household furnishings plus a dowry of 10 mayam (1 mayam = 3.3 grams) of gold, of which only 3 mayam had been paid.

> On the second day after the marriage, Nurani was brought to the home of her in-laws. She felt as if she was being treated as a house-maid. For two months, Nurani lived at her in-laws’ house. Entering the Haj season, she had an excuse to go home for meugang, to celebrate Idul Adha. Before she went, Nur tried to collect the dowry she was owed by her husband, as well as the jeulame. Not only was she not paid, she was sent away with curses from her husband and her in-laws, two months pregnant.

After she had been at home for a few days, the village chief (known in Aceh as geucik) came with a message from her husband that he had divorced her. Nurani continued to demand her jeulame and the rest of her dowry. She went back to her in-laws’ house to make her demands, but instead, her ex-husband slapped her. And there was another woman at the house: his new wife.

And so, eight months pregnant, Nurani went to court along with her mother. She demanded an official divorce so that her marital status would be clear. If home is truly heaven for women, it does not make sense to others if they sue for divorce. This phenomenon of an increasing number of women in the religious courts is a clear indication of how many men are not fulfilling their responsibilities as husbands.

When Jihad Became Synonymous with Evil

It seems as if acts of terrorism will never stop haunting humankind. Terrorists can appear anywhere, anytime, unexpectedly, and can target anyone. They seek to ignite “Global Jihad” to oppose all those who do not share their ideology, whatever their religion. And yet the language they use is the language of religion: Jihad. Are they really trying to set in motion a modern Islamic Crusade?

Definitions of Jihad throughout History

 “Jihad” is derived from the root word “mujahadah”, which means “going to war to uphold the religion of God” (al-muqatalah li-iqamati al-din). The order for Jihad in the context of war (qital) was only given after Prophet Muhammad SAW migrated to Madinah. Before that, Muslims were ordered to be accepting of whatever treatment they received from the unbelievers.

Muhammad bin Qasim, in “Fath al-Qarib”, explains that the legal status of Jihad is fardhu kifayah, a collective obligation. However, if “enemies” invade and attack Muslim countries, Jihad is no longer fardhu kifayah, but instead becomes fardhu ’ayn, an obligation for all individuals. In this context, Jihad is meant to “protect” and “preserve” the Muslim community. Jihad is shown to those who attack and war against the Muslim community (kafir harbiy). Conversely, Jihad is not aimed at those unbelievers who choose peace with the Muslims and live among them in harmony, such as kafir dzimmiy (natives), kafir musta’man (travelers), or even kafir mu’ahad (countries which have established diplomatic relations).

Within the context of Indonesia, Jihad in the sense of war was proclaimed by the organization Nahdlatul Ulama in the form of “The Jihad Resolution” of 10 November 20145, when Indonesia faced the Dutch colonialists who sought to regain their control over the country. At that time, the religious teachers, scholars and students, and the whole community, all rushed into the field of battle to do jihad and defend their religion and the homeland.

Nevertheless, as Prophet Muhammad SAW stated, Jihad in the sense of war against “enemies of Islam” falls under minor Jihad (jihad ashghar). The true jihad (jihad akbar) is “to war against desire (lust)” (mujahadah al-nafsi). This is because the real enemy, which exists within everyone, is their passions. Once, as they were returning from the field of battle, the Prophet SAW said to his companions, “Raja’na min al-jihad al-ashghar ila al-jihad al-akbar” (“We are returning from the ‘lesser jihad’ to the ‘greater jihad’” – meaning the battle against one’s passions).

According to Abu Bakar in “l’anah al-Thalibin”, Jihad (war) is only a means (wasilah) to reach a goal (maqashid), which is to provide guidance/ direction. Abu Bakar said that if this goal can be reached without going through Jihad, this is the better way. Meanwhile, Zainuddin al-Malibari, in “Fath al-Mu’in”, is more interested in elaborating the definition of Jihad as not only limited to the context of war. He stated that “Daf’u dhararu al-Ma’sumin min al-muslimin wa al-dzimmiyyin wa musta’man al-ja’i” (“meeting the needs of the poor, whether Muslim, dzimmiy, or musta’man”) also falls under the category of Jihad. A broader understanding of Jihad is to provide basic necessities, health and education.

This is the true spirit and meaning behind Jihad. The true Jihad is the jihad that is not based on hatred and hostility, and is not meant to destroy humanity.

The Prophet Muhammad SAW actually did not like solving problems through war. In other words, waging war was not what the Prophet SAW intended. Evidence of this is that in the eight battles in which the Prophet SAW took part, only one person died by his hands, Ubay bin Khalaf. Before he left for the field of battle, Muhammad SAW always ordered his troops not to kill those who were in the middle of prayers, children, the elderly, those not involved in the war, or even damage trees or kill animals.

The Hijacking of the Definition of Jihad

In recent events, the word Jihad appears with a single definition which seems to be synonymous with violence. The image of Islam in recent times is always associated with the acts of violence carried out by a certain group of terrorists. Jihad is seen as a way to carry out hate, hostility, and merciless killing.

Yet Muslims have long been familiar with Jihad. Jihad has had a variety of meanings and uses. This means that Jihad is not always interpreted as meaning “going to war in the path of Allah” (even in the proper way as of described above).

The term Jihad has been hijacked by a handful of people to fulfill their political ambitions. They use the name of Islam and the Muslim community to wage war against the West. In fact, the majority of Muslims prefer to live in peace, friendship, and mutual respect and appreciation for those of other beliefs and nations. This can be proven by the lifestyle of Muslims in all countries with a Muslim majority. But due to the acts of a handful of people, the religion and lives of Muslims are tarnished.

Therefore, in order to “re-neutralize” the definition of jihad, Muslims need to take back the true meaning for themselves. Muslims must not be trapped by the negative image and politicization carried out by terrorists in order to achieve their political goals. Muslims also need to prove to the rest of society that Jihad is not for violence or treating humankind as enemies.

Terrorism is the common enemy of the Muslim community, and must be eradicated through collective action. No religion on earth is against humanity. A religion that goes against humanity is an enemy of mankind itself. Wallahu a’lam bi al-sawab.

Abu al-A’la al-Maududi, Pelopor Ideologi Jihad Radikal Islam

LATAR BELAKANG PEMIKIRAN

Abu al-A’la Maududi merupakan figur penting dalam gerakan-gerakan keislaman di abad modern. Ia lahir dalam keluarga syarif (keluarga tokoh muslim India Utara) di Aurangabad, India Selatan, tepatnya pada 25 September 1903 M/3 Rajab 1321 H. Kedekatan keluarga ini dengan warisan pemerintahan Muslim India dan kebencian terhadap Inggris, memainkan peranan sentral dalam membentuk pandangan al-Maududi di kemudian hari.[1]

Sayyid Ahmad Hasan, ayah al-Maududi, sangat menyukai tasawuf. Karenanya ia berupaya menciptakan keadaan sangat religius dan asketik bagi pendidikan anak-anaknya. Ia membesarkan anak-anaknya dengan sistem pendidikan yang cenderung klasik. Dalam sistem ini tidak ada pelajaran bahasa Inggris dan modern, yang ada hanya bahasa Arab, Persia, dan Urdu. Karena itu, al-Maududi menjadi ahli bahasa Arab pada usia muda.[2]

Pada usia 11 tahun al-Maududi masuk sekolah formal di Aurangabad. Di sini ia mendapatkan pelajaran modern. Namun, lima tahun kemudian ia terpaksa meninggalkan sekolah formalnya itu setelah ayahnya sakit keras dan kemudian wafat. Saat itu ia kurang meminati persoalan agama, ia hanya suka politik. Karenanya, ia tidak pernah mengakui dirinya sebagai ulama. Kebanyakan biografi tentangnya hanya menyebut dirinya sebagai jurnalis yang belajar agama secara otodidak. Semangat nasionalisme Indianya tumbuh subur. Dalam beberapa tulisannya, ia memuji pimpinan Partai Kongres, khususnya Mahatma Gandhi dan Madan Muhan Malaviya.

Pada 1919 al-Maududi pergi ke Jubalpur dan bekerja di koran mingguan Partai Kongres yang bernama Taj. Di sini ia sepenuhnya aktif dalam gerakan khilafah, serta aktif memobilisasi umat Muslim untuk mendukung Partai Kongres.

Kemudian al-Maududi kembali ke Delhi dan berkenalan dengan pemimpin penting khilafah, Muhammad Ali. Bersamanya, al-Maududi menerbitkan surat kabar nasionalis, Hamdard. Selama itulah pandangan politiknya kian religius. Ia bergabung dengan gerakan hijrah yang mendorong umat Muslim India untuk meninggalkan India menuju Afganistan yang dianggap sebagai Dar al-Islam (negara Islam).

Pada 1921 al-Maududi berkenalan dengan pemimpin Jam’iyah Ulama Hind (masyarakat ulama India). Ulama Jam’iyah yang terkesan dengan bakat al-Maududi kemudian mengangkatnya sebagai editor surat kabar resmi mereka, Muslim, hingga tahun 1924. Di sinilah ia menjadi lebih mengetahui kesadaran politik umat Muslim dan jadi aktif dalam urusan agamanya.

Di Delhi al-Maududi memiliki peluang untuk terus belajar dan menumbuhkan minat intelektualnya. Ia belajar bahasa Inggris dan membaca karya-karya Barat. Jam’iyah mendorongnya untuk mengenyam pendidikan formal agama. Ia pun memulai mengenyam pendidikan formal agama. Pada 1926, ia menerima sertifikat pendidikan agama dan menjadi ulama.

Runtuhnya khilafah pada 1924 membawa perubahan besar dalam kehidupan al-Maududi. Ia begitu sinis memandang nasionalisme yang menurutnya hanya menyesatkan orang Turki dan Mesir, dan menyebabkan mereka merongrong kesatuan umat Muslim dengan cara menolak Dinasti Utsmaniyah dan kekhalifahan muslim. Ia bahkan tak percaya lagi pada nasionalisme India. Ia beranggapan bahwa Partai Kongres hanya mengutamakan kepentingan umat Hindu dengan kedok sentimen nasionalis. Ia mengungkapkan ketidaksukaannya terhadap nasionalisme dan sekutu-sekutunya dari kalangan umat Muslim. Sebagai upaya menentang imperialisme, ia menyerukan aksi Islami, bukan nasionalis. Ia percaya aksi yang ia serukan akan melindungi kepentingan umat Muslim.

Pada 1925, seorang muslim membunuh Swami Shradhnand, pemimpin kebangkitan Hindu, yang dinilai telah meremehkan keyakinan umat Muslim. Kematian Swami menimbulkan kritik media massa bahwa Islam adalah agama kekerasan. Al-Maududi tidak tinggal diam, ia menulis buku “al-Jihâd fî al-Islâm” yang menjelaskan sikap muslim mengenai jihad, sekaligus sebagai tanggapan atas kritik terhadap Islam. Buku ini mendapat sambutan hangat dari umat Muslim.

Pada masa itu keadaan pemerintahan muslim semakin tidak pasti. Dalam pengamatan al-Maududi, selama berabad-abad Islam telah dirusak oleh masuknya adat istiadat lokal dan kultur asing yang mengaburkan ajaran murninya. Karenanya ia mengusulkan pembaharuan Islam, namun tidak digubris oleh pemerintahan saat itu. Hal ini mendorongnya mencari solusi sosio-politik menyeluruh yang baru untuk melindungi umat Muslim. Ia mendirikan Jama’at Islamiyah (partai Islam), tepatnya pada Agustus 1941, bersama sejumlah aktivis Islam dan ulama muda. Segera setelah berdiri, Jama’ati Islamiyah pindah ke Pathankot, tempat di mana Jama’at mengembangkan struktur partai, sikap politik, ideologi, dan rencana aksi.[3]

Al-Maududi berkonsentrasi memimpin Jama’at Islamiyah, dan ia menulis banyak karya. Ketika India pecah, Jama’at juga terpecah. Ia, bersama 385 anggota Jama’at Islamiyah memilih Pakistan. Markasnya berpindah ke Lahore, dan ia didapuk sebagai pemimpin tertinggi. Sejak itu karier politik dan intelektualnya terkait erat dengan perkembangan Jama’at Islamiyah yang pengaruhnya terus berlangsung hingga saat ini. Ia meninggal pada September 1979 karena penyakit yang menimpanya.[4]

POKOK-POKOK PEMIKIRAN AL-MAUDUDI DAN PENGARUHNYA TERHADAP KELOMPOK-KELOMPOK KEAGAMAAN RADIKAL KONTEMPORER

Meskipun munculnya kelompok-kelompok keagamaan tidak bisa dilepaskan dari faktor-faktor sosial, politik, dan ekonomi, hanya saja faktor-faktor pemikiran atau akidah/keyakinan tidak kalah penting, karena telah memberikan dasar-dasar teoritis bagi setiap gerakan keagamaan, sehingga menjadi pendorong utama bagi kelompok-kelompok tersebut untuk bergerak dan beraktivitas.

Al-Maududi bisa dianggap sebagai tokoh pertama penggagas negara Islam. Ia merintis gerakan Jama’at Islamiyah 13 tahun setelah munculnya kelompok Ikhawanul Muslimin di Mesir. Pemikiran keagamaannya memiliki ciri khas tersendiri dengan bangunan yang sangat eksklusif, sebagaimana yang tampak pada berbagai aksi kelompok-kelompok radikal keagamaan kontemporer. Bangunan pemikiran keagamaan al-Maududi bisa digambarkan sebagai berikut:

Al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah (Pemerintahan Allah)

Al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah (pemerintahaan/kekuasaan Allah di muka bumi) merupakan salah satu gagasan pokok dari pemikiran al-Maududi yang melambangkan sentralitas Tuhan bagi alam semesta. Allah adalah ‘puncak’ alam semesta, Dia menciptakannya, mengaturnya, dan mengendalikannya.[5] Para nabi diutus untuk mendeklarasikan al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah. Kendali atas alam semesta muncul disertai segala batasan di mana tidak ada seorang pun yang dapat keluar darinya; manusia bukanlah apa-apa selain sebagai hamba Allah, tidak tunduk kecuali hanya pada perintah-Nya, tidak sujud kecuali hanya kepada-Nya, hukum yang berlaku adalah hukum-Nya.[6] Tidak ada peletak syariat selain Dia, tidak ada penolong selain Dia, tidak ada yang mendengar dan mengabulkan permohonan manusia selain Dia. Seluruh makhluk baik di langit dan di bumi adalah hamba-Nya, dan Dia-lah yang mengatur segalanya. Jika pemerintahan hanya milik Allah, maka memilih pemimpin tidak bisa dilakukan kecuali di dalam negara yang menganut hukum Allah.[7]

Seluruh nabi meneguhkan al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah dengan menekankan tiga hal pokok: pertama, otoritas tertinggi (al-sulthah al-‘ulyâ) yang kepadanya manusia wajib tunduk dan mengakui penghambaannya, yang mana ketaatan terhadapnya dibangun di atas sistem akhlak, kemasyarakatan, dan peradaban paripurna, adalah otoritas Allah. Manusia wajib berserah diri dan menerimanya berdasarkan asas tersebut. Kedua, keharusan mentaati nabi dan keputusan beliau sebagai pelaksana dan wakil otoritas tertinggi (pemimpin yang mutlak, Allah). Ketiga, bahwa hukum yang berisi ketetapan halal dan haram di seluruh bidang kehidupan adalah hukum Allah, yang menghapus seluruh hukum dunia yang dibuat manusia. Manusia sebagai hamba tidak punya hak bertanya dan berdialog mengenai hukum-hukum Allah; apa yang diharamkan-Nya menjadi haram, apa yang dihalalkan-Nya menjadi halal, karena Dia adalah Penguasa segala sesuatu, dan Dia melakukan apapun yang dikehendaki-Nya. Al-Qur`an telah menjelaskan mengenai kewajiban manusia untuk taat kepada Allah, Rasul, dan pemegang urusan mereka (ulîy al-amr), dengan penegasan bahwa “orang-orang yang tidak memutuskan hukum menurut apa yang diturunkan Allah, maka mereka itu adalah orang-orang yang kafir, zhalim, dan fasik”.[8] Tidak benar jika dikatakan bahwa ayat tersebut turun untuk Ahl al-Kitab dalam konteks-konteks khusus, tetapi itu merupakan hukum-hukum umum yang melampaui asbâb al-nuzûl (sebab-sebab turunnya) dan relevan bagi setiap umat berdasarkan kitab sucinya masing-masing di seluruh tempat dan zaman.[9]

Al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah mengandung penolakan dan pentingnya melakukan revolusi terhadap al-Hâkimîyyah al-Basyarîyyah (pemerintahan manusia), seolah-olah pembangkangan terhadapnya adalah perintah Tuhan, seperti penolakan Ahl al-Bayt di bawah pimpinan Ali dan al-Husain serta sebagian imam untuk bergabung dengan otoritas Negara Umayyah yang telah merampas hak kepemimpinan, atau mengambilnya dengan paksa, ancaman, suap, dan penipuan.[10] Artinya, teori politik di dalam Islam berpijak pada sebuah prinsip dasar, yaitu “mencabut seluruh kekuasaan dan pembuatan undang-undang dari tangan manusia, baik individu maupun kelompok. Tidak ada seorang pun yang boleh memaksakan perintah kepada sekelompok manusia sepertinya agar mereka patuh kepadanya, atau menetapkan undang-undang agar mereka tunduk dan mengikutinya, hanya Allah yang berhak melakukannya, tidak ada sekutu bagi-Nya dalam hal itu. Karenanya, negara Islam punya tiga ciri khas, yaitu: pertama, bahwa baik individu, kelompok, keluarga, kelas, atau golongan tidak punya bagian apapun dari al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah, karena hâkim (pemimpin) yang sesungguhnya adalah Allah. Kedua, selain Allah tidak ada seorang pun yang punya hak dalam pembuatan undang-undang (al-tasyrî’). Ketiga, bangunan negara Islam tidak didasarkan kecuali hanya kepada hukum Allah yang dibawa oleh Rasulullah dari sisi-Nya, yaitu hukum yang tetap, tidak berubah, meskipun keadaan dan zaman berubah. Selain itu, negara tidak boleh dipatuhi kecuali jika menerapkan hukum Allah dan melaksanakan seluruh perintah-Nya atas makhluk-makhluk-Nya.[11]

Menurut al-Maududi, pemerintahan manusia tergambar dalam tiga sistem: sekularisme, nasionalisme, dan demokrasi—semuanya adalah sistem yang mendominasi kehidupan politik di Barat. Sekularisme berarti pelepasan agama dari kehidupan sosial individu dan membatasinya hanya antara hamba dan Tuhannya. Sementara nasionalisme merupakan sistem yang berpijak pada maslahat suatu umat dan keinginan-keinginannya tanpa melihat maslahat umat-umat yang lain, akibatnya perang antarbangsa tidak bisa dielakkan, kehancuran bagi bangsa yang kalah, tidak ada tempat bagi bangsa yang lemah. Sedangkan demokrasi adalah sistem negara modern yang merepresentasikan ‘pemerintahan manusia’ di Barat, dan saat ini banyak diikuti oleh umat Muslim. Sistem-sistem ini, menurut al-Maududi, seluruhnya menolak pemerintahan Allah, yang membuat manusia tunduk kepada syahwat dan keinginan duniawinya, juga membuat masyarakat tunduk kepada hawa nafsu dan kepentingannya. Ketiadaan ‘pemerintahan Allah’ telah menyediakan ruang bagi setan untuk lebih leluasa menyebarkan kekufuran, kesesatan, dan kekerasan.

Seruan al-Maududi kepada ‘pemerintahan Allah’ dan penolakan terhadap ‘pemerintahan manusia’ itulah yang kemudian mendorong kelompok-kelompok keagamaan radikal untuk membentuk ‘masyarakat eksklusif’ di dalam masyarakat besar di suatu negara, tujuannya adalah untuk mendirikan negara Islam (al-dawlah al-islâmîyyah), merebut kekuasaan dari sistem-sistem yang ada, menolak bekerjasama dengan negara-negara non-agama, menolak tunduk kepada negara yang tidak menerapkan hukum Allah, menolak terlibat di dalam pasukan bersenjata/militer di negara tersebut, dan menolak menduduki jabatan di pemerintahan, bahkan menolak melaksanakan shalat di masjid-masjid masyarakat yang tunduk pada sistem negara tersebut.

Al-Tanzîl (Wahyu)

Dalam pemikiran al-Maududi, al-tanzîl al-ilâhîy (wahyu Tuhan) adalah perintah-perintah Allah yang harus diketahui dan diterapkan secara langsung dengan membaca teks-teks agama dan memahaminya secara harfiyah berlandaskan hanya pada otoritas teks yang terepresentasikan dalam “Allah berfirman” dan “Rasulullah bersabda”. Di sini argumen naqlîyyah (tekstual) lebih dominan daripada argumen ‘aqlîyyah (rasional). Karena argumen naqlîyyah bersifat qath’îy (pasti), tidak mengandung dua kemungkinan, maka seluruh perintah Tuhan juga bersifat muhkam (pasti), sama sekali tidak ada keraguan di dalamnya. Makanya salah satu karya terpenting al-Maududi adalah “Turjumân al-Qur`ân” yang mirip dengan “Fi Zhilâl al-Qur`ân” karya Sayyid Quthb. “Turjumân al-Qur`ân” merupakan tafsir komperhensif al-Qur`an surat demi surat dan ayat demi ayat yang berupaya menyingkap makna-makna wahyu tanpa pentakwilan atau penggabungan sejumlah tema yang terpisah-pisah untuk disajikan dalam metode terpadu.

Bahaya metode al-tanzîl (yaitu menyimpulkan hukum Tuhan langsung dari al-Qur`an tanpa bersandar kepada akal dan pengamatan inderawi) ini adalah: pertama, mengeluarkan teks dari konteksnya, menggunakannya tidak pada tempatnya, dan mentakwilkannya dengan makna menyimpang, sehingga yang menonjol adalah literalitas/tekstualitasnya tanpa pengamatan inderawi dan argumentasi rasional. Kedua, mengambil sebagian teks dan mengabaikan sebagian teks yang lain, memilih ayat-ayat yang mendukung al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah dan mengabaikan ayat-ayat lain yang menunjukkan kontekstualitas syariat, sehingga seakan-akan al-Hâkimîyyah al-Ilâhîyyah sangat sesuai dengan wahyu Allah. Ketiga, tidak adanya penggunaan akal atau bukti-bukti rasional (al-burhân), yang ada hanya keberpijakan pada otoritas teks semata, sehingga kelompok-kelompok keagamaan radikal tidak mungkin melakukan dialog dengan non-muslim sebagaimana mereka tidak mungkin berdialog dengan menggunakan akal mengenai makna-makna teks. Bagi mereka, teks bukan untuk diperdebatkan dan didialogkan, tetapi untuk diterapkan dan dilaksanakan. Keempat, ketidakmungkinan akal melawan otoritas teks, juga ketidakmungkinan melakukan interpretasi-interpretasi berbeda yang berlandaskan pada argumen rasional dan pengamatan inderawi. Kelima, mengubah pendapat menjadi fanatisme yang tak mudah goyah meskipun di hadapannya terdapat puluhan argumen rasional yang berlawanan, sehingga dialog yang dilakukan berubah menjadi perdebatan emosional yang mengedepankan pandangan-pandangan subyektif dan asumtif.

Hal-hal tersebut kita lihat tampak begitu kuat tertanam dalam kelompok-kelompok radikal di kalangan masyarakat Muslim, mereka masih hidup dalam fase teks, bersandar pada otoritas tradisi, pengetahuan mereka hanya bergulir dari satu ayat ke ayat yang lain, sejak kecil anak-anak mereka sudah diajarkan, “Mana lebih utama, aturan Allah atau aturan pemerintah? Kitab Allah atau kitab undang-undang pemerintah?” Dari sini bisa dipahami alasan al-Maududi menolak kontekstualitas syariat, maksudnya pandangan bahwa syariat mempunyai dasar-dasar kontekstual (al-usus al-wadh’îyyah), padahal di antara keistimewaan syariat Islam adalah kontekstualitasnya. Meskipun hukum Islam merupakan kehendak Ilahiyah (al-irâdah al-ilâhîyyah), tetapi ia berlandaskan prinsip pembelaan terhadap maslahat-maslahat manusia. Hukum Islam adalah hukum positif yang berpijak pada dasar-dasar kontekstual dalam membela kepentingan masyarakat umum (al-mashâlih al-‘âmmah) yang oleh para ahli ushul fikih disebut dengan al-kullîyyât al-khams (lima prinsip universal), yaitu: al-dîn (agama), al-nafs (jiwa/kehidupan), al-‘irdh (kehormatan), al-‘aql (akal), dan al-mâl (harta). Seluruh kajian yang dilakukan para ahli ushul fikih mengenai hukum Islam dasarnya adalah kontekstualitas syariat dengan tujuan “mendatangkan manfaat dan menolak bahaya”.

Al-Tsunâ`îyyah al-Muta’âridhah (Dualisme Kontradiktif)

Di sini maksudnya adalah dualisme kontradiktif antara dua hal yang berlawanan: yang baik dan yang buruk, yang hak dan yang batil, yang benar dan yang salah, hidayah dan kesesatan, keimanan dan kekufuran, Islam dan Jahiliyah, Islam dan Barat, malaikat dan setan, surga dan neraka. Tidak ada celah untuk mencari jalan tengah di antara dua hal yang saling berlawanan itu, atau berpindah dari yang satu kepada yang lain secara bertahap: yang baik bersifat mutlak dan yang buruk bersifat mutlak, yang hak bersifat mutlak dan yang batil bersifat mutlak. Tidak ada tempat untuk sikap-sikap semu penuh keraguan. Ini adalah dualisme yang menegaskan hubungan antara ‘pemerintahan Allah’ dan ‘pemerintahan manusia’, antara ‘pemerintahan agama’ dan ‘pemerintahan non-agama’ di level aksi maupun praktik.

Hubungan antara keduanya adalah hubungan pertentangan tanpa penengah atau mediasi. Eksistensi salah satu pihak tergantung pada raibnya pihak yang lain. Tegaknya kebatilan adalah raibnya kebenaran. Karena itu, pertentangan antara kelompok-kelompok keagamaan dan otoritas negara yang berkuasa, masing-masing pihak menunggu kesempatan untuk menyerang pihak lainnya dan berupaya menggagalkan rencana-rencananya. Kalau otoritas negara lebih kuat, maka tekanan dan pemaksaan akan selalu datang darinya, sementara kelompok-kelompok keagamaan melakukan perlawanan spontan, parsial, dan deklaratif untuk menegakkan kebenaran. Pertentangan juga terjadi antara “Jahiliyah” dan “Islam”. Jahiliyah merupakan simbol jalan pemikiran alamiyah yang menjadikan alam sebagai sumber pengetahuan, yang dalam konteks politik dan sosial merupakan (1) sumber terbentuknya ‘pemerintahan manusia’ yang penuh dengan kecintaan terhadap diri sendiri dan syahwat, (2) sumber peralihan dari feodalisme kepada kapitalisme, (3) sumber pendidikan dengan orientasi pekerjaan, bukan pendidikan dengan basis agama dan keyakinan. Model pemikiran semacam inilah, menurut al-Maududi, yang telah melahirkan aliran-aliran politik di Barat, seperti nasionalisme, kolonialisme, imperialisme, dan seterusnya. Sedangkan Islam merupakan jalan kenabian dan pandangan para nabi terhadap manusia dan alam semesta yang menjadikan Allah sebagai Penguasa atas segala sesuatu. Al-Maududi menegaskan, tidak ada cara untuk mendamaikan dan menyatukan jalan Jahiliyah dan jalan Islam. Namun ia sama sekali tidak menyebutkan warisan-warisan keilmuan dari kedua pihak; bagaimana Barat mengalami kemajuan dengan pemikiran alamiyah (al-fikr al-thabî’iy), sedangkan Islam mengalami kemunduran dengan pemikiran ketuhanan (al-fikr al-ilâhîy).[12]

Pertentangan juga terjadi antara Islam dan Barat, spiritualisme dan materialisme, agama dan non-agama. Aliran-aliran yang ada di Eropa, baik filsafat, politik, sosial, dan ekonomi, seluruhnya adalah aliran-aliran Jahiliyah: materialisme, nasionalisme, demokrasi, sekularisme, sosialisme, fasisme, nazisme, dan lain sebagainya. Di Barat, setelah agama ditinggalkan karena kondisi Gereja di abad pertengangan, tidak ada yang tersisa kecuali dunia. Barat telah memulai ‘keberakhirannya’ secara akidah (keyakinan). Sains, atheisme, rasionalisme, naturalisme, dan sosialisme seluruhnya merupakan aliran yang berlandaskan penipuan dan penyesatan. Kemudian umat Muslim datang dan menjadi budak-budaknya. Di India peradaban Barat telah runtuh karena umat Muslim menyembahnya. Umat Muslim di negeri-negeri Islam harus mewaspadai penyakit tersebut. Al-Maududi berkeyakinan, bahwa walaupun peradaban Barat telah runtuh, namun Islam akan tetap hidup di hati manusia dan di dalam tradisi luhur mereka.

Manhaj al-Inqilâb (Metode Kudeta/Perebutan Kekuasaan)

Menurut al-Maududi, pertentangan antara dualisme kontradiktif itu bisa diakhiri dengan cara melakukan al-inqilâb. Di dalam bahasa Persia “al-inqilâb” dimaknai “al-tsawrah”, seolah-olah revolusi tidak bisa dilakukan kecuali dengan kudeta, dan seolah-olah kudeta merupakan jalan revolusi. Cara seperti ini banyak terjadi di dalam tradisi Asia, yang oleh al-Afghani disebut dengan “perubahan sosial dengan jalan kudeta kekuasaan politik”, perubahan yang menyeluruh di dalam masyarakat dengan jalan pendidikan dan mencakup beberapa generasi.[13]

Al-Maududi menolak cara-cara bertahap, reformasi, dan sistem demokrasi dalam melakukan perubahan menyeluruh itu. Upaya-upaya perbaikan dengan tahapan-tahapan dan sistem demokrasi seluruhnya ia anggap sebagai tipuan belaka, janji-janji manis untuk menipu rakyat, baik oleh kaum sekuler atau pun golongan pengikut demokrasi.

Al-inqilâb adalah jihad, kata al-Maududi, yaitu “upaya terus-menerus dan perjuangan berkelanjutan untuk menegakkan sistem kebenaran (nizhâm al-haqq),” yang merupakan rukun keenam Islam meskipun tidak disebutkan. Walaupun tidak termasuk rukun Islam, tetapi oleh sebagian orang jihad dianggap sebagai kewajiban (farîdhah) untuk melindungi Islam. Jihad bukanlah seperti anggapan orang-orang Eropa sebagai “perang suci”, tetapi merupakan al-fikrah al-inqilâbîyyah (gagasan revolusi dan kudeta).

Golongan al-inqilâb adalah golongan Allah, golongan kebenaran dan keadilan untuk menjadi saksi bagi manusia. Tugasnya adalah “melenyapkan sumber-sumber keburukan dan permusuhan, memangkas akar kelaliman dan kerusakan di muka bumi serta investasi menjijikkan, mengekang nafsu ‘tuhan-tuhan’ pendusta yang menyombongkan diri di muka bumi tanpa hak, mereka menjadikan diri mereka sebagai tuhan-tuhan selain Allah, membasmi akar ‘ketuhanan’ mereka, serta menegakkan sistem hukum dan peradaban”. Golongan al-inqilâb adalah satu-satunya kandidat terpilih yang ditugaskan mengambil alih kekuasaan untuk membasmi kerusakan. Untuk itu, tidak membagi jihad menjadi “jihad ofensif” dan “jihad defensif”, sebab dua istilah ini hanya cocok dipakai untuk perang-perang patriotik (nasionalisme). Jihad di dalam Islam tidaklah demikian, tetapi bersifat “ofensif” dan “defensif” sekaligus. “Ofensif berarti bahwa partai Islam menentang penguasa-penguasa yang memegang teguh prinsip-prinsip yang berlawanan dengan Islam, melenyapkan akarnya, dan tidak ragu menggunakan kekuatan perang untuk itu”.

Al-Maududi membagi aksi besar tersebut (jihad) ke dalam empat hal: pertama, menyucikan pemikiran dan mengikatnya dengan penanaman dan pengembangan. Di sini perhatian al-Maududi terfokus kepada pengajaran, pendidikan, dan penyucian peradaban. Kedua, menyeleksi individu-individu yang saleh dan menggabungkan mereka dalam satu sistem dan mendidik mereka untuk membentuk kelompok kepemimpinan pilihan. Ketiga, berupaya melakukan perubahan sosial menyeluruh dalam agama dan dunia, tidak hanya memberikan bimbingan dan arahan. Keempat, memperbaiki hukum dan manajemen, karena perubahan sistem hukum merupakan cara untuk mencegah kerusakan di muka bumi.

Al-inqilâb bisa terjadi dengan cara membentuk kelompok pilihan yang mengembang tugas untuk melakukannya, karena “negara Islam tidak muncul di luar kebiasaan (mendadak), akan tetapi untuk memunculkan dan merealisasikannya pertama-tama harus dilakukan gerakan menyeluruh berlandaskan pada pandangan hidup Islam dan pemikirannya, juga pada kaidah-kaidah dan nilai-nilai moral yang sesuai dengan ruh Islam dan kekuatan karakternya, yang demi itu semua sekelompok orang menunjukkan persiapan mereka untuk memberikan warna kepada kemanusiaan, mereka berusaha menyebarkan mentalitas Islam dan mengerahkan seluruh daya untuk menyiarkan ruh dan akhlak Islam di masyarakat”. Kemudian kelompok pilihan tersebut sedikit demi sedikit akan berubah menjadi gerakan rakyat menyeluruh. Gerakan ini sangat kuat dan kukuh sehingga dengan upayanya yang terus-menerus dan keras mampu merubah dasar-dasar kehidupan Jahiliyah.[14]

Mereka, kelompok pilihan itu, adalah pemimpin sesungguhnya yang tidak berharap pamrih yang bersifat sementara dan tidak memikirkan kepentingan-kepentingan kaumnya, tetapi mereka adalah pemimpin yang merealisasikan hukum Allah. Al-Maududi menekankan dakwah Islamiyah dalam tiga prinsip, yaitu: menyembah Allah, menyucikan jiwa, dan revolusi menyeluruh. Ia menjelaskan mengenai prinsip ketiga, “Seruan kami kepada seluruh penduduk bumi untuk (1) melakukan revolusi menyeluruh terhadap dasar-dasar hukum masa kini, yang dengan itu para pemimpin thagut dan lalim melakukan ketidakadilan dan memenuhi bumi dengan kerusakan, (2) mencabut kepemimpinan fikrîyyah dan ‘amalîyyah dari mereka hingga diambil alih oleh sekelompok orang yang beriman kepada Allah dan hari akhir. Mereka memegang teguh agama yang benar, tidak congkak dan tidak berbuat kerusakan di muka bumi”.[15]

Al-Maududi menekankan peranan para pelajar untuk membangun masa depan dunia Islam. Hal ini mengindikasikan anjuran bagi kelompok-kelompok keagamaan untuk merekrut dan melibatkan para pelajar. Para pelajar adalah pelopor kesadaran, mereka punya kemampuan untuk berpikir dan keahlian untuk memimpin. Para pelajar di negeri-negeri Islam, dalam kondisi-kondisi yang memperihatinkan, melihat perpecahan umat akibat imperialisme dan pengaruh peradaban Barat di dalam kebudayaan mereka. Untuk itu, di pundak mereka terdapat tanggung jawab transformasi warisan peradaban kepada generasi-generasi mendatang. Hal ini bisa dilakukan dengan dua jalan: pertama, khusus untuk pelajar; kedua, khusus untuk pemerintah. Khusus untuk pelajar, adalah (1) mendidik mereka berlandaskan tiga prinsip Islam; prinsip tauhid, prinsip kerasulan, dan prinsip kebangkitan setelah mati, (2) pentingnya memfokuskan upaya untuk menjaga prinsip-prinsip tersebut dengan memegang teguh akhlak dan peradaban Islam dalam menghadapi kejahatan orang-orang yang menyebarkan budaya-budaya pelacuran di tengah-tengah para pemuda muslim. Khusus untuk pemerintah, pentingnya melakukan pendidikan militer atas dasar prinsip-prinsip Islam sehingga para pemuda mampu merealisasikan tujuan-tujuan Islam.[16]

Al-Îmân (Keimanan) dan al-Thâ’ah (Ketaatan)

Bagi mayoritas umat Muslim agama adalah keimanan dan penerimaan ajaran-ajarannya tanpa rasionalisasi dan argumentasi atas kebenaran keimanan tersebut. Di dalam keimanan peran perasaan dan emosi lebih dominan, sementara rasio terabaikan. Karenanya tidak ada dialog, tidak ada diskusi, yang kian menguatkan fanatisme agama.[17]
Ketika al-Maududi berbicara mengenai prinsip-prinsip Islam, ia tidak bicara mengenai keimanan terhadap realitas dengan jalan indera dan pengamatan, juga dengan jalan rasio dan konklusi, akan tetapi berbicara mengenai keimanan dengan jalan kenabian, kenabian para rasul. Akal manusia kerap tersesat dalam perjalanannya, pengetahuannya cacat dan tidak sempurna. Manusia hakikatnya adalah makhluk yang bodoh karena cenderung kepada hawa nafsu. Sementara para rasul merupakan manusia paling sempurna, makhluk paling utama, karenanya mereka menjadi sumber ilmu dan pengetahuan.

Jadi, kenabian merupakan jalan meraih ilmu yang benar, bukan dengan upaya keras manusiawi, tetapi dengan jalan wahyu dan ilham. Bukti kebenaran nabi adalah mukjizat. Kenabian sangat penting bagi manusia, karena manusia tidak cukup dengan dirinya sendiri. Meskipun ia mampu mengetahui dunia, tetapi ia tidak mampu mengetahui akhiratnya.[18]

Kenabian mengandung keagamaan murni, yaitu keimanan kepada Allah, malaikat, kitab suci, rasul, dan hari akhir, terutama wujud Tuhan beserta sifat-sifat-Nya. Di dalamnya tidak ada kandungan sosial yang mengikat keimanan dengan problem-problem realitas agar jiwa tidak tertutup.

Menurut al-Maududi, keimanan berhubungan erat dengan ketaatan, karena dengan keimanan orang akan taat. Setiap organisasi sosial harus berpijak pada kepercayaan kuat para anggotanya dan kepatuhan mereka terhadap pemimpin. Banyak masyarakat Islam yang ‘runtuh’ karena ketiadaan dua pilar tersebut. Dalam menjalankan perintah Allah, adanya ketaatan adalah mutlak dan tanpa memperdebatkannya.

Definisi al-Maududi mengenai Islam sesuai dengan definisi yang dikenal secara umum, yaitu ketundukan dan kepasrahan.[19] Alam semesta tunduk kepada kaidah tertentu, demikian juga kehidupan manusia. Kekafiran, dalam pandangan al-Maududi, adalah pembangkangan, kebodohan, kezhaliman, dan kerugian yang nyata. Keimanan menjadikan manusia taat menjalankan perintah dan hukum. Orang yang tidak beriman berarti ia menolak, membangkang, dan keluar dari agama. Ketaatan kepada nabi adalah wajib, baik terkait dengan apa yang kita pahami ataupun yang tidak kita pahami. Sedangkan ibadah juga berarti ketundukan hamba kepada Tuhannya. Hukum-hukum syariat menuntut manusia untuk memenuhi hak Allah berupa ketaatan, keimanan, dan ketundukan kepada-Nya.[20]

Al-Mahârim (Larangan) dan al-Thuqûs (Ritual)

Hijab, kerudung, dan mahram merupakan ciri khas kelompok-kelompok radikal keagamaan yang membedakannya dengan kelompok-kelompok lainnya sebagai bentuk penegasan identitas keagamaan dan pemisahan diri masyarakat. Pada tubuh manusia terdapat bagian-bagian yang muharramah (dilarang untuk dilihat) sehingga harus ditutup. Pada hubungan-hubungan kemanusiaan juga terdapat sisi-sisi muharramah yang tidak boleh didekati. Singkatnya, alam ini penuh dengan hal-hal yang dilarang (muharramât) yang kemudian menjadi hal-hal yang dusucikan (muqaddasât) sebagaimana banyak terjadi di berbagai masyarakat di belahan dunia dewasa ini.

Oleh karena itu, masalah hijab muncul seolah-olah merupakan masalah subtansial di dalam Islam dan di dalam kelompok-kelompok keagamaan. Masalah-masalah seks, menundukkan pandangan, memegang tangan perempuan, menghadiri pesta, antara mahasiswa dan mahasiswi duduk bersama di universitas, semua ini bisa menjadi fitnah dan syubhat! Manusia adalah makhluk yang penuh dengan keinginan, hasrat, dan kecenderungan sehingga harus dikekang dengan larangan-larangan, yaitu menutupi sisi-sisi tertentu pada manusia yang tidak mungkin didekati, dilihat, dan disentuh.

Dari situ kemudian lahir ekstrimisme agama yang hanya memperhatikan syiar, ritual, dan penampilan luar. Agama berubah menjadi hanya sebatas aktivitas ragawi, kurang lebih seperti mengiklankan diri agar dilihat oleh banyak orang. Begitu mudah mengklaim bahwa memanjangkan jenggot adalah sunnah, mengklaim bahwa memegang tasbih merupakan aktivitas berdzikir, mengklaim bahwa jilbab putih adalah pakaian islami, dan seterusnya.

Islam menjadi agama yang penuh dengan hukuman (sanksi), hukuman berat bagi orang yang melanggar al-muharramât (larangan). Syariat telah menggariskan ikatan-ikatan untuk mengontrol jiwa dan mengekang hawa nafsu serta menghukumnya, sehingga alam seluruhnya dikuasai oleh syariat, segala sesuatu ada aturannya.

AL-MAUDUDI DAN TAKFIR (PENGKAFIRAN)

Sebagaimana al-Maududi telah menciptakan istilah “al-hâkimîyyah”, ia juga merupakan tokoh utama yang membawa gagasan “al-takfîr” (pengkafiran) dan “al-tajhîl” (penjahiliyahan) terhadap masyarakat-masyarakat yang tidak berpijak pada ‘pemerintahan Allah’. Seluruh masyarakat kontemporer yang tidak menerapkan syariat Islam dan sistem-sistem sosial yang sesuai dengan pandangan al-Maududi dianggap sebagai “Jahiliyah”. Artinya, ia menafikan keislaman dari mayoritas umat Muslim.[21]

Al-Maududi menggunakan konsep “Jahiliyah” sebagai senjata epistemologis untuk menolak pemikiran dan filsafat Barat yang menurutnya dibangun untuk meneguhkan konsep negara dan sistem yang jauh dari agama. Ia juga menggunakan konsep “Jahiliyah” sebagai sarana untuk menolak pola-pola hidup dan sistem-sistem yang ada di India, bahkan dunia secara keseluruhan—seolah-olah ia memaksakan pengalaman pribadinya di wilayah geografis India atas seluruh dunia. Hal ini terlihat dari pernyataannya di dalam buku “Nazharîyyah al-Islâm al-Siyâsîyyah” mengenai kondisi umat Muslim, “Pemikiran umat Muslim saat ini adalah pemikiran warisan Jahiliyah. Pemikiran yang mereka ambil dari peradaban Barat adalah pemikiran Jahiliyah baru di masa kontemporer.”

Al-Maududi tidak hanya mengkafirkan masyarakat Barat yang jelas-jelas berada di luar ruang lingkup pemikiran dan keyakinannya saja, tetapi ia juga mengingatkan kembali tentang hubungan hegemoni Barat dan runtuhnya Dinasti Utsmaniyah yang diyakininya sebagai khilafah bagi seluruh umat Muslim di dunia. Ia mengajak untuk memikirkan kembali peperangan dengan menggabungkan seluruh bangsa dan budaya dalam ‘negara Islam murni’ guna melawan ‘kekafiran murni’.

Al-Maududi menggambarkan negara Islam sebagai negara berbasis akidah, terbentuk bukan karena kesatuan iklim, kebangsaan, ras, dan kelas, tetapi karena kesatuan akidah spiritual murni, yaitu negara menyeluruh yang hegemonik dan absolut dengan berlandaskan al-qânûn al-ilâhîy (hukum Tuhan) yang diwakilkan kepada seorang hâkim (pemimpin) untuk melaksanakannya terhadap manusia.[22]

Mengenai hak dan kewajiban masyarakat yang berafiliasi kepada negara Islam tersebut, di dalam sejumlah karyanya al-Maududi menegaskan pemisahan antara umat Muslim dan non-Muslim di satu sisi, dan pemisahan di antara umat Muslim sendiri di sisi lain. Ia mengatakan, “Orang yang tidak menerima aturan jama’ah (aturan yang ditetapkan negara Islam), maka selamanya ia tidak berhak untuk turut serta dalam persoalan-persoalan kenegaraan, dan di dalam hukum ia hidup sebagai ahl al-dzimmah. Dalam berbagai keadaan ia tidak mendapatkan keuntungan apapun di pemerintahan, karena negara ini adalah negara partai khusus bagi orang mukmin dengan akidah khusus dan dengan pemikiran yang khusus pula.” Di sini metode al-Maududi dalam memahami Islam dijadikan sebagai standar kewarganegaraan; ia memisahkan manusia di negera tersebut menjadi “muslim” dan “ahl al-dzimmah”.

Orang muslim mendapatkan hak politiknya secara penuh, sedangkan orang non-muslim tidak mendapatkan jaminan apapun kecuali hak hidup, hak milik, dan kehormatannya. Adapun orang yang menentang peraturan di kalangan umat Muslim, maka hak-haknya akan dicabut dan ia dianggap sebagai bagian dari ahl al-dzimmah—atau bisa saja ia dikafirkan dan difatwakan bahwa darahnya halal.[23]

Gagasan takfir yang didengungkan oleh al-Maududi pada masanya belakangan ini dipakai oleh kelompok-kelompok radikal untuk membunuh orang-orang di negeri-negeri mereka dan memusuhi sistem-sistem politik serta komunitas-komunitas pemikiran dan filsafat. Gagasan takfir ini membagi manusia menjadi dua golongan: (1). Kelompok pengikut yang berafiliasi kepada golongan agama dan Allah; (2). Kelompok musuh yang tunduk kepada dunia dan manusia.[]
_______________________________

[1] Khalid al-Najjar, Abû al-A’lâ al-Mawdûdîy, 1979, hal. 2
[2] Ibid.
[3] http://www.islamist-movements.com/2941
[4] Ibid.
[5] Al-Maududi, Minhâj al-Inqilâb al-Islâmîy, Jiddah: al-Dar el-Sa’udiyyah, Cet. III, 1988, hal. 17
[6] Al-Maududi, al-Khilâfah wa al-Mulk, Kuwait: Dar el-Qalam, Cet. I, 1978, hal. 13 – 14
[7] Al-Maududi, Nazhrîyyah al-Islâm al-Siyâsîyyah, Cairo: Dar el-Fikr, Cet. I, 1967, hal. 49 – 50
[8] QS. al-Ma`idah: 44, 45, dan 47
[9] Al-Maududi, al-Khilâfah wa al-Mulk, Kuwait: Dar el-Qalam, Cet. I, 1978, hal. 18
[10] Ibid., hal. 229
[11] Al-Maududi, Nazhrîyyah al-Islâm al-Siyâsîyyah, Cairo: Dar el-Fikr, Cet. I, 1967, hal. 49
[12] Al-Maududi, Nazhrîyyah al-Islâm al-Siyâsîyyah, Cairo: Dar el-Fikr, Cet. I, 1967, hal. 51 – 52
[13] Al-Maududi, Minhâj al-Inqilâb al-Islâmîy, Jiddah: al-Dar el-Sa’udiyyah, Cet. III, 1988, hal. 9 – 13
[14] www.tourathtripoli.org%2Fphocadownload%2Fmakalete_motanoui3a%2Fassar%2520abi%2520al3ala%2520almawdoudi.pdf&usg
[15] Al-Maududi, al-Islâm wa Mu’dhilât al-Iqtishâd, Beirut: Muassasah al-Risalah, Cet. I, 1981, hal. 89
[16] Hassan Hanafi dalam “Atsar Abîy al-A’lâ al-Mawdûdîy ‘alâ al-Jamâ’ât al-Dînîyyah al-Mu’âshirah”.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Al-Maududi, Mabâdi` al-Islâm, tanpa penerbit, tanpa tahun, hal. 2
[20] Ibid., hal. 69
[21] http://www.islamist-movements.com/2941
[22] Dalam hal ini al-Maududi tidak menyebutkan karakter dan kepribadian pemimpin tersebut, juga syarat-syarat pemilihannya. Ia juga tidak menyebutkan apakah pemimpin tersebut disukai oleh rakyatnya atau tidak.
[23] Shalih Zahruddin, al-Harakât wa al-Ahzâb al-Islâmîyyah wa Fahm al-Âkhar, hal. 36

Child marriage: Written in the verses?

Published in The Jakarta Post, Paper Edition 27 May 2016.

In many studies on child marriage in Indonesia, economic motivation is said to be the major driver behind this practice. This premise is not completely misleading. However, I once met a teenager who wanted to get married because she felt sinful after hanging out alone with a boy who was not her muhrim or closest family.

In another case, a girl “insisted” that her male friend marry her after they exchanged several text messages. Deep in her heart, she liked this boy, but she feared exchanging text messages could lead her toward “unwanted feelings and behavior”. Getting married therefore became the only solution for her to express her affection toward the opposite sex.

After the lovebirds got married, she and her “husband” promised to refrain from having sexual intercourse until they both graduated. They still live separately in different boarding houses and only meet for dinner. Her “husband” is not yet able to support her, as his own daily needs are still covered by his scholarship. But she said proudly, “this is what I call ‘dating after marriage’.”

Cases such as those aforementioned, involving 17 to 20-year-olds in my encounters, do not occur only in small villages or remote areas. Such cases also occur in urban areas, at universities and in educated, middle-income Muslim society.

To these people, the body, particularly women’s bodies and sexuality, are alarming. Women’s sexuality leads to worries about the many horrible things that could possibly happen. Women are not allowed to express their sexuality in any way outside the institution of marriage. They have tried to limit their contact with the opposite sex by covering their heads and avoiding any skin contact. But even using hijab is not enough. They need more assurance.

People learn these viewpoints and believe them as truths taken from various sources, including religious texts and references. These views often apply a purely textual approach in interpreting the texts and neglect the context in which they arose. This approach constricts their imagination about social interaction; anything related to male-female relationships is forbidden, except as legally avowed through marriage.

Furthermore, within circles holding such beliefs, marriage is used as a means to legitimate subordination of women, and even their repression. Women are not allowed access to contraceptives because, in their view, family planning is not in line with sharia. Furthermore, their religious beliefs also call on them to multiply the Prophet Muhammad’s followers by giving birth to as many children as possible.

Their desire to fulfill God’s command is commendable, but the gender division of labor and women’s continuous reproductive work are the consequences of this imbalance in gender relations.

For girls, public space excludes them and is male-dominated. For example, when a girl gets pregnant and gives birth, if she is still at school or university, she will automatically take maternity leave for at least one semester, or simply drop out. She will gradually stop being involved in student organizations and will not be allowed to socialize, except perhaps for running household errands. The husband, on the other hand, continues at school or in his job, and all the domestic work is handled by his wife.

The cases above indicate that textualist religious viewpoints are very powerful in legitimating child marriage. Typically, children do not have a voice in decision-making. However in a few cases the girls insist on an early marriage by persuading their parents using religious texts and references.

Follow-up studies are needed to further explore the religious views and interpretations used to encourage child marriage. Our research outfit, Rumah Kita Bersama ( Our Collective House ), has initiated this effort by publishing a guide to religious texts on child marriage, Fikih Kawin Anak. However, further support is still needed from a more progressive Islamic perspective to counter prevailing arguments.

Surely every marriage is supposed to bring about virtue and harmony. However, when a marriage is not supported by equal rights between husband and wife, marriage always becomes an arena of subordination which pushes women into the domestic space, with increasingly unbalanced gender and power relations.